Abstract: This study addresses the strategic problem of supply chain formation on the basis of the quantities and prices of end-products to be manufactured and sold on a market. The manufacturing process is planned from the products bills of materials (BOM) and distributed on the resources available in the enterprises network. Resources are modeled as capacitated systems with piecewise-linear throughput functions of the workload. The problem of maximal profit generation and sharing among the firms of the network is analyzed and solved as a cooperative game. The proposed profit sharing rule is constructed from the dual of the profit maximization problem. It is both efficient and rational, with more fairness than the Owen rule of classical Linear Production Games.
INTRODUCTION
Based on the cooperative game theory approach, a supply chain can be modelled as a coalition of partners pooling their resources and sharing the same utility function (profit). The works of Cachon and Netessine (2004) and Nagarajan and Sošić (2008) provide convincing interpretations of supply chain design problems as cooperative games.
In order to form a supply chain, the enterprises should select the quantities of end-products that they plan to sell on the market and use their means of production in agreement with the product structure and the operation sequence of the goods to be manufactured. Such an arrangement should be performed in the most profitable manner for all the enterprises involved. The choice of the most efficient coalition of enterprises sharing their manufacturing and logistic resources is the main issue of the Linear Suppy Chain Game (LSCG) studied in (Hennet and Mahjoub, 2010) . As a complementary issue for the LSCG, the benefits created by cooperatively organizing production should be rationally and fairly rewarded among the members of the coalition, so as to stabilize the involvement of the supply chain members.
Along this research line, the LSCG has been formulated as an extension of the linear production game (LPG) studied by Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Owen (1975) . One limitation of this formulation is the difficulty to combine rationality and fairness in the allocation policy, due to the fact that shadow prices of resources drop to zero when their capacity is in excess in the coalition. This study considers manufacturing resources not only from the capacity viewpoint but also from their utilization conditions, by introducing in the model the cost of the WIP (Work in Progress). Then, the PLSCG (Piecewise Linear Supply Chain Game) defined and studied in this paper represents the saturation constraints on resources in a more detailed manner, while preserving linearity of the model. The main reason for maintaining the linearity property is to remain in the scope of the LPG, with the resulting possibility of using the Owen set profit allocation rule (Owen 1975 ) as a rational profit allocation policy.
The main originality of the PLSCG formulation introduced in this paper is that it represents the saturation constraints on resources in a more precise and operational manner, by taking into account the influence of the workload on the throughput. Then, the value function of the chain integrates as a positive term the anticipated revenue to be obtained from the sale of the end-products on the market and as negative terms manufacturing costs and holding costs of all the products and components.
The superadditivity property of the PLSCG demonstrated in the paper allows for an easy computation by Linear Programming of the maximal profit achievable from the formation of a supply chain in the network of enterprises. Then, a stable profit allocation rule is constructed as a generalization to the PLSCG of the Owen set concept used for LPG (Owen 1975 , Van Gellekom et al. 2000 . A practical advantage of the proposed PLSCG allocation policy over the classical Owen policy for the LSCG is that it improves the fairness of the profit allocation rule by integrating the costs of resource utilization before reaching the capacity limits.
Section 2 introduces the supply chain formation problem declined from the product structure of the goods to be sold on the market. Section 3 solves the PLSCG by optimizing the expected profit of the supply chain and constructing a stable profit allocation policy. An illustrative numerical example is provided in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
A PRODUCT STRUCTURE DRIVEN SUPPLY CHAIN FORMATION PROCESS

The BOM-related multi-stage model
The concept of a supply chain concentrates some major features of business organization in today's Society. It characterizes a network of autonomous production units connected through an information and communication network and through a logistic network. In the recent literature, such a network is sometimes called "cloud of collaborative enterprises" or "cloud supply chain" (Lindner et al., 2010) . Typically, the information network carries commercial proposals, products orders, manufacturing and delivery protocols. The logistic network used to transport goods and products may be owned by enterprises in the network or by subcontractors. In any case, a supply chain can be viewed as a multistage production and transportation system in which the different transformation stages are performed by different enterprises. Requirements planning models (Baker 1993) can then be used to define and distribute responsibilities and manufacturing orders among the partners. In this view, the product structure supports the enterprise network organization, especially under an extended view of the BOM (Bill of Materials), such as the G-BOM (Generic BOM, (Lamothe et al., 2005) ), integrating product families rather than simple products.
A convenient graphical tool to represent multi-product multistage bills of materials is the gozinto graph proposed by Vazsonyi (1955) . An example of such a graph is represented in Fig. 1 . According to the classical decomposition of products structures into levels (see e.g. Salomon, 1991) , the three end-products numbered 1, 2, 3 are level 0 products, the two products numbered 4, 5 are level 1 products and the three products 6, 7, 8 are level 2 products. . Intermediate and primary products are numbered in the increasing order of their level. The level of product i, for i=g+1,...,n is the maximal number of stages to transform product i into a final product. Each production stage is supposed to have several input products but only one output product. The BOM technical matrix , is defined as follows: according to a given manufacturing recipe, production of one unit of product i requires the combination of components
 . It can be noted that under a level-consistent ordering of products, matrix  has a simple lower triangular structure (Hennet 2003) . For example, matrix  associated with the structure of Fig. 1 is written as follows: Additionally, multistage production by several producers highly differs from multistage production by a single producer because of the need for negotiation, contracts and higher coordination requirements. It also carries new possibilities in the design stage for selecting partners, sharing resources, risks and rewards.
Let N be the set of N enterprises who candidate to be part of the supply chain to be created. Each candidate enterprise is characterized by its production resources: manufacturing plants, machines, work teams, robots, pallets, storage areas.
The supply chain model is prospectively formulated over a reference time horizon and in stationary conditions. Thus, lead times are not included in the model and material supply is supposed perfectly coordinated with manufacturing processes. Then, let )) (( ij x X  be the matrix of the quantities of product i produced (or obtained by exchange) at firm j and 
Equations (1) for i=1,...,n are summarized in vector form:
The output vector can be computed from the global throughput vector by the following relation:
, with I the n n  identity matrix.
From the structure of matrix , matrix ) (   I is regular and
is lower triangular (with 1s on the diagonal) and nonnegative. Then, for a nonnegative output vector y, the global throughput vector is also nonnegative since it is expressed as follows:
Resource capacity and WIP
Consider the R types of resources available in the network (r=1,…,R). The amount of resource r available for enterprise j is denoted rj k , and the resource capacity matrix is defined as: Let ri m be the amount of resource r necessary to produce 1 unit of product i.
The first issue addressed in this paper is how to represent resource capacity in a consistent manner with the resource saturation phenomena observed in practice. Basically, a resource such as a machine or transportation equipment is characterized by its decreasing efficiency relative to the load.
Classical capacity constraints used in aggregate production planning problems are simple saturation functions of the "all or nothing" type. Such capacity constraints are valid and will be used in our model. In particular, the capacity constraints restricted to a coalition N S  are written:
But constraints (5) are not sufficient to describe the saturation phenomena, because they do not represent the average workload in the system. Using the "Little law" (Little, 1961) , systems with saturation functions completely described by (5) are associated with constant lead times. However, as stressed in Karmarkar (1993) , lead times data show a superlinear increase of lead times with capacity utilization, and this property is true, at various magnitude levels, for any type of physical resources. In queuing theory, a lead time is classically decomposed into a processing time of constant expected value and a waiting time whose mean value increases with the mean population (or WIP, Work In Progress). Such convex lead time variations with the WIP are associated with concave output functions of the WIP called clearing functions, as represented on Fig. 2 . For resource r located at enterprise j, the WIP is denoted rj w and the throughput is denoted rj  . It is given by:
or, in matrix form: This phenomenon has been largely ignored in the production planning literature (Asmundsson et al. 2003) , probably because of the difficulty to integrate nonlinear constraints in planning problems that are already complex, with large number of variables. To keep our supply chain model simple, this nonlinearity will be represented by a piecewise linear function that represents the inverse clearing function (Fig. 3) . This function expresses the WIP as a function of the actual throughput. (10), for all the resources, we define two nonnegative vectors of resource dependent parameters: 
3.THE PIECEWISE LINEAR SUPPLY CHAIN GAME
The profit maximization problem
Unit purchasing costs of primary products (products 6, 7, 8 in the example of Fig.1 ) and manufacturing costs of intermediate and end-products (products 1-5 in the example of Fig.1 
End-products are the goods sold on the market at fixed and given market prices:
The profit expected from manufacturing and sale on the market of the vector of outputs y is given by:
which can be re-written:
. Additional storage costs will be subtracted from this expression to formulate the total expected profit of the chain. . This property is important for two reasons. The first one is that it allows for an easy computation of the maximal possible profit value by Linear Programming. The second one is that when vector S e is given, problem (P S ) only contains continuous variable and the optimal value of its criterion is also the optimal value of the criterion of its dual problem, without any "duality gap". This property will be used to compute a profit allocation policy for the enterprises in the network.
A profit sharing mechanism for the member enterprises
The key problem in forming a supply chain is to guarantee that it will be stable in the sense that the member enterprises will not want to separate from each other to create a more profitable chain. In the cooperative game theory, the set of stable profit allocations is called the "core" of the game. A profit allocation is noted 
, there is no coalition alternative in which he could obtain a strictly greater reward.
If holding costs were neglected, problem (P S ) could be reformulated, as in (Hennet and Mahjoub, 2010) Linear Production Games have been introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972) and also studied by Owen (1975) , Van Gellekom et al. (2000) . The solution rule proposed by (Owen 1975) 
optimal solution of the dual of problem (P N '). The optimal dual variables are interpreted as the marginal costs (or shadow prices) of resources. In an Owen assignment, the payoff of each player equals the value of his resource bundle under the unit marginal cost of resources. Moreover, it has been shown in (Owen, 1975 ) that this vector of payoffs forms a subset of the core in this production game.
A similar construction can be achieved with problem (P N '), with a more detailed evaluation of the cost of resources resulting from the introduction of the WIP in the model. 
The coefficient of variable r z in the objective function corresponds to the quantity of resource r available for production if the network: Rationality of this policy can also be shown, as for the Owen set, from the property that the constraints defining the dual problem of ) ( S P with S e fixed, are the same for any coalition S (Van Gellekom et al. 2000) .
Then, from the definition of the core, the following property is derived
Property 2
The feasible payoff profile relations (14) belongs to the core of the Supply Chain Game (PLSCG).
The proposed profit allocation mechanism for the PLSCG has the same property of coalitional stability than the Owen set for the LPG. However, it has been observed that the Owen set solution of the LPG has the drawback of being unfair by not rewarding some enterprises having a positive marginal contribution to the global profit (Hennet and Mahjoub, 2010) .
Typically, this unfairness mainly arises from the fact that in the optimal dual solution, resources in excess have null 
